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Hot Damn Duo Group

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Luke Thompson
Luke Thompson

Cyber Date HOT!


Cyber dating has grown in popularity and respectability since the advent of online personals in the mid-1990s. Computer dating began in the 1960s, when scientists used mainframe computers to match people based on interests and appearances. Journalist Andrea Orr, however, suggests that cyber dating puts a technological spin on a much older trend: matrimonial services, which matched couples in the 1800s.




cyber date



Millions gravitate to sites such as Match.com, where users can post a free personal profile but must pay a monthly subscription fee to e-mail other users. Online daters scan hundreds of profiles per visit, limiting searchesbased on categories such as region, age, ethnicity, height, weight, politics and religion. Although half of Match.com subscribers are under 30, older singles who may be divorced or widowed are increasingly using online services. Specialized dating sites have grown in recent years: Blacksingles.com caters to African Americans, while RightStuffDating.com enables Ivy League graduates to meet others of their intellectual ilk. Gays and lesbians, while represented on mainstream dating sites, also connect on sites such as PlanetOut.com.


Some singles have successful online dating experiences: eHarmony.com reports that more than 1,500 couples met and married through the site in its first three years, and Match.com boasts 90,000 successful matches each year. Others, however, grow weary of endless profile searches and disappointing dates, and opt for a lower-technology, less commercialized way of finding prospective partners.


These new authorities are regulatory in nature and require CISA to complete mandatory rulemaking activities before the reporting requirements go into effect. CIRCIA requires CISA to develop and publish a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), which will be open for public comment, and a Final Rule. CIRCIA also mandates that CISA consult with various entities throughout the rulemaking process, including Sector Risk Management Agencies, the Department of Justice, other appropriate Federal agencies, and a soon-to-be formed, DHS-chaired Cyber Incident Reporting Council. This work is already underway.


When information about cyber incidents is shared quickly, CISA can use this information to render assistance and provide warning to prevent other organizations from falling victim to a similar incident. This information is also critical to identifying trends that can help efforts to protect the homeland.


The January 2023 report doesn't contain new recommendations, but does round up cybersecurity oversight going back to July 1, 2020, and identifies certain trends in cybersecurity oversight from OIG, the Government Accountability Office and other oversight organizations inside DOD.


One key observation relates to the nature of oversight itself. Oversight relating to the use of the National Institute of Standards and Technology cybersecurity framework skews strongly to just a few of the five pillars of NIST's framework: identify, protect, detect, response and recovery.


The identify function - which includes asset and identity management, along with the protect function which includes developing and implementing cyber defense strategies, were frequent topics in oversight reports. The respond and recover functions, covering resilience efforts, were not as regularly featured in oversight reports.


"Cybersecurity reports issued during the past two years demonstrate that the DOD continues to face significant challenges in managing cybersecurity risks to its systems and networks," the report states. Not surprisingly, the IG report suggests that implementing open recommendations is a key step to improving DOD cybersecurity.


"The longer it takes the DOD to implement corrective actions, the more likely it is that DOD cybersecurity vulnerabilities and threats could be exploited, causing security incidents that disrupt critical operations; leading to inappropriate access to and disclosure, modification or destruction of sensitive and classified information; and threatening national security," the report states.


The threat of cyber breach is one of the most significant risk management challenges facing corporations, officers and directors today. Realizing this risk does not fit easily within protections afforded by traditional insurance, the insurance industry has created and brought to market a variety of cyber-risk policies providing both first-party loss and third-party liability coverage. The insurance-buying community has responded enthusiastically, as noted in online reports of year-on-year growth of cyber-risk insurance premiums.[1]


Setting the stage for the coverage discussion, this article will first discuss the current state of cyber-breach litigation in order to identify key characteristics of claims against entities whose information systems have been hacked, as well as against their officers and directors. The article will then analyze the retroactive date and policy inception date exclusions, and their potential for knocking virtually all of the typical lawsuits that follow a cyber-breach out of coverage. Given this risk, insureds considering the purchase of cyber-liability insurance should carefully consider whether the product being offered provides acceptably broad coverage and, if not, whether modifications to these exclusions can be negotiated.


The conduct challenged in customer cases inevitably focuses on inaction by the hacked entity. A litany of alleged failures to protect the PII, PFI, or PPI of the putative plaintiff class typically is at the forefront of the allegations in these cases. The alleged failures often include failure to adhere to an industry standard of cyber-security, such as those set forth in the ISO/IEC 27000 Series, failure to implement firewalls, encryption and other security features to protect customer data, failure to monitor the computer system and discover the hack in a timely manner, and failure to promptly notify persons whose PII, PFI, or PPI was stolen.[5]


These retroactive date and policy inception date-related exclusions potentially afford cyber-liability insurers a ready basis upon which to deny coverage of the typical customer, employee, payment-card financial institution, regulatory, and shareholder derivative claims against insureds following a hack. As discussed above, the allegations of wrongdoing in such cases inevitably include a contention that the hacked company failed to implement computer system protections. Such allegations of inaction, by their nature, will often not be assignable to a specific point in time, but instead will span a period of time potentially dating back to when the policyholder first implemented the allegedly deficient computer system or configuration. The impact of the retroactive date and policy inception date-related exclusions should be considered in the context of these recurring allegations of failure to act.


Commercial concerns are understandably wary of cyber-breaches and the fallout that could follow the same. As such, the market for insurance products tailored to this risk is large and growing. Insurance purchasers and their brokers should, however, first acquire working knowledge of the nature of the allegations commonly included in post-breach lawsuits and, armed with that knowledge, scrutinize the insurance product or products they are considering buying to ensure those products provide an acceptable scope of protection. Depending on the wording of retroactive date and policy inception date-related exclusions, the third-party liability protections afforded by a given product may be less than meets the eye.


This Resource Center is designed to help Covered Entities understand how to comply with the Cybersecurity Regulation. Among other things, it provides links to industry guidance, answers frequently asked questions (FAQs), and explains how and when to submit cybersecurity-related filings to DFS, including the requisite Certifications of Compliance and notifications of Cybersecurity Events.


To sign up for updates on important regulatory guidance and information related to cybersecurity for New York financial services companies, or to access your existing subscriber preferences, please go to the DFS Email Updates Signup Page.


Effective March 1, 2017, the Superintendent of Financial Services promulgated 23 NYCRR Part 500, a regulation establishing cybersecurity requirements for financial services companies. The following provides answers to frequently asked questions concerning 23 NYCRR Part 500. Terms used below have the meanings assigned to them in 23 NYCRR 500.01. Please note that the Department may revise or update the below information from time to time, as appropriate.


Yes. Both HMOs and CCRCs are Covered Entities. Pursuant to the Public Health Law, HMOs must receive authorization and prior approval of the forms they use and the rates they charge for comprehensive health insurance in New York. The Public Health Law subjects HMOs to DFS authority by making provisions of the Insurance Law applicable to them. CCRCs are required by Insurance Law Section 1119 to have contracts and rates reviewed and authorized by DFS. The Public Health Law also subjects HMOs and CCRCs to the examination authority of the Department. As this authorization is fundamental to the ability to conduct their businesses, HMOs and CCRCs are Covered Entities because they are "operating under or required to operate under" DFS authorizations pursuant to the Insurance Law. Moreover, since these entities have sensitive, private data, their compliance with cybersecurity protection is necessary.


Under N.Y. Banking Law 590(2)(b-1), an exempt entity will need to prove its "exempt organization" status. Since the notification is not an authorization from the Department, an Exempt Mortgage Servicer, under N.Y. Banking Law 590(2)(b-1), will not fit the definition of a Covered Entity under 500.1(c). However, Exempt Mortgage Loan Servicers that also hold a license, registration, or received approval under the provisions of Part 418.2(e) are required to prove exemption and comply with regulation. With respect to the DFS cybersecurity regulation, given the ever-increasing cybersecurity risks that financial institutions face, DFS strongly encourages all financial institutions, including exempt Mortgage Servicers, to adopt cybersecurity protections consistent with the safeguards and protections of 23 NYCRR Part 500. 041b061a72


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